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GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT:  
REVISING STRICKLAND AS APPLIED TO 
FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE 
Mark Loudon-Brown* 
INTRODUCTION 
As a public defender some years ago, I tried a case in which the 
prosecution sought to admit the results produced by a software 
program called the Forensic Statistical Tool, or “FST.”1 At the time, 
FST had recently been developed and put into use by the Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) of New York City to analyze 
mixtures of DNA recovered from potentially incriminating evidence.2 
It was a new program, novel by my estimation, so I filed a motion 
requesting a Frye3 hearing to challenge the admissibility of the 
incriminating results produced by the software. The motion spanned 
some thirty pages, complete with exhibits that included various 
laboratory reports and articles regarding the OCME’s proffered 
validation studies. I handed a courtesy copy of the relatively bulky 
motion to the judge one morning at the beginning of court. He denied 
the request without so much as turning the first page. 
Unfortunately, this type of judicial reaction to an admissibility 
challenge is not uncommon. Judges routinely overrule admissibility 
challenges, as if to say, “once admissible, always admissible.” As one 
practitioner has observed, “Even when the most vulnerable forensic 
sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and handwriting—are 
attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier 
                                                                                                                 
* Senior Attorney, Southern Center for Human Rights. Many thanks to Patrick Mulvaney, Managing 
Attorney of the Capital Litigation Unit at the Southern Center for Human Rights, for discussing ideas 
and reading drafts.  
 1. The record of the case has since been sealed, so all identifying information has been withheld. 
 2. For a more detailed discussion of the FST software, see People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 567, 
577–82 (Sup. Ct. 2015). There the court found that the results produced by the FST software did not 
meet the Frye test. Id. at 587. 
 3. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The case was tried in the Bronx, New 
York, which is a Frye jurisdiction. 
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decisions rather than facts established at a hearing.”4 A prominent 
federal judge and law school dean concurred in a piece that they 
coauthored: 
[J]udges frequently rely on the experience of a forensic 
practitioner, and the long-standing use of a given technique, 
rather than focusing on the technique’s scientific 
validity. . . . Therefore, even as many judges have come to 
recognize the weak scientific underpinnings of some 
methods, they continue to allow such testimony primarily 
because nearly all other judges have done so before.5 
If sophisticated-sounding scientific evidence is an undesirable 
subject matter for a judge to tackle anew, it can be even more 
daunting for a defense attorney to confront, particularly one faced 
with a crushing caseload. It can be tempting to avoid a challenge to a 
vulnerable forensic science discipline—be it new, novel, or simply 
recently called into question—when the lawyer reasonably believes 
that the evidence will be admitted regardless.6 Worse still, it may 
seem reasonable to disregard any adversarial challenge to 
incriminatory science altogether, and to opt instead for a different 
defense or to encourage a guilty plea. With hundreds of other clients 
to assist, why invest the time and resources needed to comprehend a 
new scientific technique sufficiently to cross-examine an expert who 
has dedicated his or her career to learning the field?7 It is an 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions 
for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S110 (2005); see also Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 
2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. III, at XXXV (2015) (“Few defense lawyers challenge the 
reliability of expert evidence because few trial judges grant requests for Daubert hearings.”). 
 5. Harry T. Edwards & Jennifer L. Mnookin, A Wake-Up Call on the Junk Science Infesting Our 
Courtrooms, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-wake-up-call-
on-the-junk-science-infesting-our-courtrooms/2016/09/19/85b6eb22-7e90-11e6-8d13-
d7c704ef9fd9_story.html?utm_term=.833de5d38ced [http://perma.cc/BT3C-KJHC]. 
 6. If this decision seems reasonable to the defense attorney, all the more reasonable it will look to a 
court of review searching for reasons to affirm a conviction. 
 7. See Neufeld, supra note 4 (“Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal 
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. . . . Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge 
with appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined to mount a Daubert challenge, they lack 
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intimidating endeavor. Defense challenges to forensic evidence, 
therefore, are often inconsequential at best or incompetent at worst.8 
The appellate courts have not rectified this situation or the 
incentives it engenders. Admissibility decisions are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.9 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
(IAC) succeed only upon satisfaction of the highly deferential two-
pronged standard announced in Strickland v. Washington.10 As one 
solution, I propose that when it comes to the admission of forensic 
science evidence against a criminal defendant at trial, the Strickland 
standard should be altered. 
Once a reviewing court finds that an attorney performed 
deficiently in combating incriminating forensic science evidence, 
Strickland prejudice should be presumed. In other words, if a 
reviewing court has determined that trial counsel was deficient in his 
or her adversarial testing of incriminating forensic evidence, that 
court must reverse the conviction and order a new trial, lest 
defendants be deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel and the integrity of convictions founded on 
forensic evidence be left in doubt. It should not matter whether, in the 
opinion of a court reading a cold record that was deficiently 
developed as far as the forensic science is concerned, the defendant 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
A few benefits would flow from this revision. First, rather than 
allowing courts to bypass the deficiency prong in favor of finding no 
prejudice, the revision would require courts to address the deficiency 
question when incriminating forensic science evidence is at issue—if 
the court finds defense counsel’s assistance sufficient, the inquiry 
                                                                                                                 
the requisite knowledge and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). One former federal judge has suggested that 
this standard of review change. Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxxv. “Failure to hold a Daubert hearing 
where the reliability of expert evidence has been credibly challenged should be considered an error of 
law, as should the refusal to allow a defense memory expert where the case turns on conflicting 
recollections of past events.” Id. 
 10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The two prongs are (1) deficient 
performance and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id. 
3
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ends; if not, the court, in reversing, thereby reiterates citable 
standards for defense counsel going forward. This, in turn, would act 
as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the criminal defense bar 
performs consistently with what is constitutionally required of it in 
the future. 
Second, presuming prejudice in the forensic science IAC context 
will more properly police trial courts that are inclined to treat 
challenges to forensic evidence hastily and help ensure the integrity 
of convictions based on forensic science. Rather than asking courts to 
undertake the nigh impossible task of deciphering how an effective 
challenge to sophisticated scientific evidence could hypothetically 
have altered the outcome of a case, the law would ensure that the 
science is effectively challenged in the first place. 
I.   The Foundation to Alter Strickland 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. 
Washington, held that to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the 
defense.11 The defendant must demonstrate both prongs; so, 
reviewing courts are permitted to skip right to the prejudice prong 
and find against a defendant on prejudice grounds, even if defense 
counsel was deficient.12 In fact, the Strickland Court actually 
encouraged reviewing courts to bypass the deficiency prong if the 
prejudice prong is dispositive: 
[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s 
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 697. 
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prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that 
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to 
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system 
suffers as a result.13 
By only engaging in a prejudice analysis and bypassing the 
deficiency question, as courts are wont to do under Strickland,14 
reviewing courts neglect their duty to ensure the integrity of 
convictions based on forensic science evidence and to ensure the 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in such 
cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. 
 14. For example, concurring in the judgment in Harrington v. Richter, Justice Ginsburg agreed that 
by “failing even to consult blood experts in preparation for the murder trial,” trial counsel did not 
function as the “counsel” envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. 562 U.S. 86, 113 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg did not believe the “strong force of the prosecution’s case” 
was reduced sufficiently to warrant relief. Id. at 113–14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Ellis 
v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1090 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have yet another reason for concluding that 
Mr. Ellis has failed to establish prejudice related to Mr. Stayton’s decision (assumed to be erroneous) for 
failing to consult and/or call as an expert witness Dr. Long.”); Friedlander v. United States, 570 F. 
App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because we conclude that Dr. Friedlander has failed to satisfy the 
prejudice prong of Strickland with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in 
the certificate of appealability, we affirm the denial of his motion to vacate.”); Schlesinger v. United 
States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 489, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] Court need not examine a petitioner’s claims 
under both prongs of the Strickland analysis if those claims are plainly deficient under either one. In this 
case, the petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail in the absence of demonstrable 
prejudice.”); Duronio v. United States, No. 10-1574 (JLL), 2012 WL 78201, at *3 (D. N.J. Jan. 10, 
2012) (“With this framework in mind, the Court now turns to Petitioner’s arguments and will first 
address whether Petitioner set forth facts to support the arguments that he suffered prejudice as a result 
of Mr. Adams’s alleged deficiencies.”); Redmon v. Johnson, No. S16H1197, 2018 WL 415714, at *3 
(Ga. Jan. 16, 2018) (per curiam) (noting that where a habeas court incorrectly rules that counsel was not 
deficient, if the appellate court finds no prejudice, “an appeal would result in affirming the habeas 
court’s judgment”); Hodges v. State, 213 So.3d 863, 874 (Fla. 2017) (“In light of the totality of the 
evidence, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on the ground that there is no reasonable probability 
that more thorough preparation by trial counsel through consultation with experts would have made any 
difference to the outcome of the trial.”); Lupoe v. State, 794 S.E.2d 67, 77 (Ga. 2016) (“[A]ssuming, 
without deciding, that a timely special demurrer would have had merit and that trial counsel performed 
deficiently rather than strategically in failing to file one, Lupoe has not shown prejudice.”); People v. 
Snell, No. 2-08-0949, 2011 WL 10088352, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 21, 2011) (“Defendant’s argument 
that expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome should have been subjected to a Frye hearing 
lacks merit, and defendant, therefore, cannot establish prejudice.”). 
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Today, almost thirty-four years later, the Strickland standard still 
governs. Yet the Strickland Court articulated the standard before the 
advent of forensic DNA testing, before the emergence of 
electronically stored information as evidence in a criminal case, and 
years before disciplines long believed reliable—such as fingerprint, 
hair, toolmark, bitemark, and fire analysis, and even Shaken Baby 
Syndrome—were exposed as fraught with error.15 In a 
groundbreaking report issued in 2009, the National Research Council 
of the National Academies found that “no forensic method other than 
nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the 
capacity to consistently and with a high degree of certainty support 
conclusions about ‘individualization’ (more commonly known as 
‘matching’ of an unknown item of evidence to a specific known 
source).”16 Since Strickland, the law governing the admissibility of 
forensic evidence has evolved,17 but Strickland has not. 
In other contexts, however, the IAC inquiry operates differently. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that prejudice should be 
presumed,18 or the prejudice standard lowered,19 when addressing 
certain types of ineffectiveness claims. In Powell v. Alabama, the 
Court found that the defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel after his counsel was rushed to trial without time to prepare a 
defense in a publicized case, which deprived the defendant of “the 
right of counsel in any substantial sense.”20 Under those 
circumstances, “[n]either [counsel] nor the court could say what a 
prompt and thorough-going investigation might disclose as to the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL 
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 23 (2016) [hereinafter 
PCAST Report]. 
 16. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]. A subsequent report in 2016 
concluded that “many forensic feature-comparison methods have historically been assumed rather than 
established to be foundationally valid based on appropriate empirical evidence.” PCAST Report, supra 
note 15, at 122 (emphasis in original). 
 17. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1999) (extending Daubert); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (altering the Frye test). 
 18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58, 73 (1932). 
 19. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980). 
 20. Powell, 287 U.S. at 58. 
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facts.”21 Accordingly, prejudice was presumed, and the conviction 
was reversed.22 
Later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that to 
establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on the claim that the 
defendant’s attorney was laboring under an actual conflict of interest, 
the defendant must show that the lawyer’s performance was 
adversely affected.23 “Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of 
interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not 
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.”24 In so holding, the 
Cuyler Court referred to Glasser v. United States,25 where the 
Supreme Court observed that, “[t]o determine the precise degree of 
prejudice sustained . . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right 
to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to 
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of 
prejudice arising from its denial.”26 
Then, in United States v. Cronic,27 decided the same day as 
Strickland, the Supreme Court reiterated that meaningful adversarial 
testing is an integral part of the constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel: 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the 
right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to 
survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. 
When a true adversarial criminal trial has been 
conducted—even if defense counsel may have made 
demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the 
Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its 
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 73. 
 23. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. 
 24. Id. at 349–50. 
 25. Id. at 348–49. 
 26. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1942). 
 27. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
7
Loudon-Brown: Garbage In, Garbage Out: Revising Strickland As Applied To Forens
Published by Reading Room, 2018
900 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
constitutional guarantee is violated.28 
Thus, in the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel context, the 
showing required to establish a violation can vary with the 
circumstances. When forensic evidence is at stake, the inquiry should 
be altered as well. The inability to make an informed prejudice 
determination is a theme that runs through Powell, Cuyler, and 
Glasser, especially where there was a breakdown in the ability of a 
defense attorney to effectively engage in a meaningful adversarial 
testing of the government’s case.29 That these cases were decided 
before Strickland does not alter the principle for which they stand, 
namely, that where prejudice is difficult or impossible to determine, 
the test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel should be 
different. Where a defense attorney is deficient in failing to subject 
incriminatory forensic science evidence to meaningful adversarial 
testing, prejudice is likewise too difficult, if not impossible, of an 
inquiry for courts to undertake. 
When incriminating forensic science is used against a defendant at 
trial the IAC inquiry should be different from that announced in 
Strickland, especially given the rapidly growing importance of such 
evidence within the criminal legal system and the complexities 
inherent in the various forensic disciplines.30 Upon a finding that 
counsel has been deficient in meaningfully combating incriminating 
forensic science evidence, the reviewing court should reverse the 
conviction without further inquiry into prejudice. 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 656–57 (emphasis added). 
 29. See generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Glasser, 315 U.S. at 60; Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 30. This idea has been acknowledged and foretold elsewhere. For example, “The Supreme Court 
may ultimately determine that when counsel fails to request a Daubert hearing or query forensic 
evidence pre-trial, this dereliction is equally as damaging as failing to cross-examine experts at trial.” 
Valena Beety, Changing the Culture of Disclosure and Forensics, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
580, 584 (2017). “The determination that counsel is effective, or not, is tied to ‘reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms,’ and those norms are changing.” Id. 
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II.   The Deficiency Prong Is Important 
Courts, in determining whether defense counsel was deficient, 
often look to the applicable practice guidelines and ethical 
standards.31 In Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court noted that the 
standards articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) are 
“standards to which we long have referred as ‘guides to determining 
what is reasonable.’”32 Then, in Rompilla v. Beard,33 the Supreme 
Court quoted directly from the applicable ABA standards as a guide 
for what is reasonable performance by an attorney: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. . . . The 
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s 
admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting 
guilt or the accused’s stated desire to plead guilty.34 
Applying that standard to a case involving forensic science evidence, 
then, defense counsel must inform themselves about and understand 
the forensic evidence in their cases sufficiently to enable an effective 
challenge. 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, meanwhile, 
require “competent representation,” defined as “the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
representation.”35 Therefore, an attorney must acquire knowledge of 
and skill in the relevant forensic science prior to a trial (or prior to 
counseling a client to plead guilty) in order to provide competent 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 
(2000). 
 32. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also Williams, 529 
U.S. at 396 (referencing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and accompanying commentary). 
 33. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005). 
 34. Id. (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993)) (emphasis 
added). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
9
Loudon-Brown: Garbage In, Garbage Out: Revising Strickland As Applied To Forens
Published by Reading Room, 2018
902 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
representation.36 “In determining whether a lawyer employs the 
requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors 
include . . . whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or 
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in 
question.”37 This guideline explicitly provides another option to an 
attorney who is too daunted by the notion of learning science to do so 
himself or herself: associate with an attorney with the requisite 
knowledge and experience to test the evidence in a meaningfully 
adversarial way.38 
As former federal judge Nancy Gertner implored, “Counsel have 
to learn that advocacy in cases involving forensic evidence requires 
familiarity with the kind of issues the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) Report raised. And further, courts need to make it clear that 
such familiarity may be one of the benchmarks in evaluating when 
assistance of counsel is constitutionally ineffective.”39 This 
imperative highlights the reasons why courts should be compelled to 
review the alleged deficiency of attorneys in any cases involving 
forensic science—doing so solidifies with the force of the law what is 
mandated of lawyers and reminds both attorneys and judges of the 
benchmarks against which to review attorney performance in the 
future.40 Indeed, “Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel rulings may 
increasingly cement the obligation of the defense to seek discovery 
on forensics and to retain experts who can independently examine the 
analysis conducted and opine on its reliability.”41 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at cmt. 1. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789, 792 (2011). Judge Gertner issued a standing order in her courtroom, which 
provided that the admissibility of trace evidence “ought not to be presumed; that it has to be carefully 
examined in each case, and tested in the light of the NAS concerns, the concerns of Daubert/Kumho, 
and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Procedural Order: Trace Evidence at 3, No. 1:08-cr-
10104-NG (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2010). 
 40. Gertner, supra note 39, at 792. 
 41. Brandon L. Garrett, The Crime Lab in the Age of the Genetic Panopticon, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
979, 990 (2017). As the inquiry pertains to seeking and securing necessary discovery, the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: DNA Evidence (3d ed. 2007) provide an accessible guide for what 
should, at a minimum, be expected of counsel. Analogues can be drawn from that guide to other forensic 
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In the meantime, however, “a defense attorney could provide 
effective assistance under the constitutional standard (Strickland) and 
yet be incompetent under the ABA Model Rule because the latter 
does not require a showing of prejudice.”42 This should not, and need 
not, be the case when forensic science evidence is involved, and 
Judge Gertner recognized as much.43 “While the constitutional 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Strickland v. 
Washington is notoriously low, the standard with respect to scientific 
evidence should be different.”44 The deficient performance prong is 
vital for courts to address when incriminating forensic science 
evidence is at issue. If that prong is not satisfied, the deficiency alone 
should suffice to constitutionally entitle a defendant whose liberty is 
at stake to a new trial—at which the forensic science is subject to 
meaningful adversarial testing. 
III.   Abandoning the Prejudice Prong 
A.   Judges Aren’t Scientists 
Determining prejudice where defense counsel failed to 
meaningfully test incriminating forensic evidence is a fanciful 
endeavor. Judges are not scientists. A study conducted in 2001 
concluded with resounding clarity that judges, as a whole, are not 
institutionally equipped to make probative determinations regarding 
forensic science.45 A survey of 400 judges revealed that 48% 
believed that their education was insufficient to adequately prepare 
them to deal with the range of scientific evidence proffered in their 
                                                                                                                 
disciplines. 
 42. Paul C. Gianelli et al., Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 1, 2 (2012). 
 43. Gertner, supra note 39, at 792. 
 44. Id. at 792–93; see also Neufeld, supra note 4, at S110 (“[T]he principal failing of Daubert is its 
misplaced reliance on a robust adversarial system to expose bad science. In reality the playing field is 
not level, and the system is anything but robust.”). 
 45. See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging 
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001). 
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courtrooms.46 Perhaps even more telling, however, was the following 
finding: 
Although the majority of judge–respondents reported 
falsifiability to be useful when determining the merits of 
proffered scientific evidence, the results clearly indicate 
that most judges did not fully understand the scientific 
meaning of this concept. 
 
From the answers that were provided, the researchers could 
only infer a true understanding of the scientific meaning of 
falsifiability in 6% (n = 23 of 400) of the judge’s 
responses.47 
When asked to elaborate on the meaning of “falsifiability,” judicial 
answers included, “I would want to know if the evidence was 
falsified,” and “I would look at the results and determine if they are 
false.”48 In fact, the concept of falsifiability has nothing to do with 
the evidence or test results in a given case, but rather it asks a 
threshold question of whether a given scientific theory is refutable or 
testable.49 
Meanwhile, only 4% of the judges who indicated that error rate 
was a useful criterion for determining admissibility of proffered 
scientific evidence had a true understanding of the concept of “error 
rate.”50 Yet error rate was one of the factors Daubert explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 444. 
 48. Id. at 445. 
 49. See, e.g., KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 48 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or 
refutability, or testability.”). This explanation can be found in Daubert itself. See Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining 
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it 
can be (and has been) tested.”). 
 50. Gatowski et al., supra note 45, at 447. 
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instructed judges to consider in making admissibility 
determinations.51 
The study concluded that: 
[A]lthough the judges confidently and overwhelmingly 
responded that the Daubert criteria were useful decision-
making guides, the majority did not seem to recognize or 
acknowledge their lack of understanding about how to 
apply some of the guidelines as part of the admissibility 
decision-making process. 
 
This is an important finding. Judges’ difficulty 
operationalizing the Daubert criteria, especially 
falsifiability and error rate, suggests limitations in the 
judiciary’s understanding of science.52 
These findings are hardly surprising; judges, after all, are non-
scientists who are expected to efficiently handle diverse and 
demanding caseloads. But if trial judges do not know science, what 
makes a reviewing judge any more knowledgeable? And if a 
reviewing judge does not know science any better, then how can such 
a judge weigh the incriminating forensic science evidence against an 
ineffective science-based challenge to arrive at a reliable probative 
determination as to prejudice? Moreover, because the inquiry is 
within the context of an IAC claim, judges may be attempting to 
make this prejudice determination from a deficiently-developed 
record. 
Further complicating the inquiry is the “CSI Effect,” that is, “the 
idea that certain television programs . . . along with high-profile cases 
involving DNA tests, fiber analysis, and fingerprinting databases, 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Indeed, error and uncertainty are complicated yet crucial concepts to 
understand in order to ensure the accuracy of forensic evidence. See generally Ted Vosk, Uncertain 
Justice Measurement: Uncertainty and the Discovery of Truth in the Courtroom, 54 JUDGES’ J. 8, 8–11, 
39 (2015). 
 52. Gatowski et al., supra note 45, at 452–53. 
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ha[ve] led members of the public to believe that forensic evidence 
[is] both widely available and almost infallible.”53 Although the 
extent to which this effect has a bearing on a given case may be 
debatable,54 its presence hovers over all trials involving forensic 
evidence: from attorney voir dire to jury deliberation to judicial 
decision-making. This additional intangible factor is inaccessible to a 
reviewing judge’s prejudice inquiry. 
B.   Unjust Results 
A reviewing court should not be the institution entrusted to make 
the critical prejudice inquiry when there has been a deficient 
challenge to forensic science; reviewing judges are ill-suited to that 
task when incriminating forensic science evidence is at issue. 
Consider again the CSI effect briefly mentioned above. 
Conservatively interpreted, the CSI effect suggests that jurors will 
have preconceived notions, one way or the other, when confronted 
with forensic science evidence.55 Some may treat it as infallible, 
others may be suspicious. But what we do know for certain is that 
people are wrongfully convicted because of the misapplication of 
forensic science.56 If jurors wrongfully convict people based on 
faulty forensic science (which they do), and if judges do not 
understand how forensic science—faulty or not, adequately tested or 
not—affects juries (which they do not), then why are judges relied on 
to determine how (hypothetically) accurate and (hypothetically) 
                                                                                                                 
 53. ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 149 (2015). 
 54. See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, The CSI Effect: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 465 (2006) (“If anything, the data hints that, if there is any effect of CSI, 
it is to exalt the infallibility of forensic evidence, favor the prosecution, or pre-dispose jurors toward 
findings of guilt.”); Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning 
Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 359–61 (2006) 
(finding that in cases charging rape or sexual misconduct, as well as in circumstantial evidence cases, 
jurors were more inclined to require scientific evidence to convict). 
 55. Shelton, supra note 54, at 359–61. 
 56. According to data maintained by the Innocence Project, “[m]isapplication of forensic science is 
the second most common contributing factor to wrongful convictions . . . .” Misapplication of Forensic 
Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-
science/ [https://perma.cc/4FJQ-QXUU] (last visited July 8, 2018). 
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adequately-tested forensic science evidence would or would not 
affect the outcome of a case? 
Practical experience demonstrates that the requirement of a 
prejudice inquiry under these circumstances produces unjust results.57 
One study revealed that of cases involving exonerations following 
trials at which erroneous forensic evidence was presented, “[d]efense 
counsel rarely made any objections to the invalid forensic science 
testimony in these trials and rarely effectively cross-examined 
forensic analysts who provided invalid science testimony.”58 These 
were exonerations, not IAC reversals. After all, “It is typical in 
litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, for courts to 
find that any failures by counsel did not prejudice the defense, 
including by citing to seemingly ‘overwhelming’ evidence of 
guilt.”59 
A stark example of the reluctance of courts to find prejudice, 
notwithstanding deficient performance, is found in Hinton v. 
Alabama.60 There, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, found 
that the “trial attorney’s failure to request additional funding in order 
to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly 
believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law 
constituted deficient performance.”61 Mr. Hinton had been sentenced 
to death after being convicted largely on the basis of firearms and 
toolmark evidence; the defense expert had only one eye, and thus had 
difficulty using the forensic microscope during his examination.62 
However, this deficient performance alone was not enough to get Mr. 
Hinton off of death row.63 Rather, the Court remanded the case to 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1147, 1175 (2016). 
 58. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009). 
 59. Garrett, supra note 57, at 1175. 
 60. See generally Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). 
 61. Id. at 1088. The Court balked at finding too much deficiency, noting that “the inadequate 
assistance of counsel we find in this case does not consist of the hiring of an expert who, though 
qualified, was not qualified enough.” Id. at 1089. 
 62. Id. at 1085–86. 
 63. Alan Blinder, Alabama Man on Death Row for Three Decades Is Freed As State’s Case Erodes, 
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determine whether the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.64 Mr. Hinton was later exonerated, but not because any court 
found prejudice.65 Rather, the case was dismissed by a trial judge 
after prosecutors conceded that no match could be made between the 
recovered bullets and the gun.66 No court-conducted prejudice 
inquiry ever resulted in a judicial determination that Mr. Hinton’s 
deficient representation prejudiced him—an innocent man convicted 
and sentenced to death because of inadequate adversarial testing of 
otherwise incriminating forensic evidence. 
Would Mr. Hinton have been exonerated had a proper prejudice 
inquiry been made? Not necessarily, which gets to the crux of the 
matter. Consistent with Strickland, a reviewing court could find that 
there was no “reasonable probability”67 that the outcome would have 
been different if another, albeit more qualified, expert had been used. 
That is precisely what the Supreme Court foretold in its Hinton 
decision: “We do not today launch federal courts into examination of 
the relative qualifications of experts hired and experts that might 
have been hired.”68 To be fair, that statement was made in the context 
of a deficiency analysis.69 But once asserted, it carries equal—if not 
more—force in a subsequent prejudice determination. If courts are 
instructed not to second guess whether a lawyer was deficient for 
hiring an inadequate expert, then a fortiori such a decision could not 
be prejudicial under Strickland. Yet in Hinton, it clearly was. 
                                                                                                                 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/anthony-ray-hinton-alabama-
prison-freed-murder.html [https://perma.cc/BYK2-YSA5]. 
 64. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1090. 
 65. Blinder, supra note 63. 
 66. See generally Anthony Hinton Exonerated After 30 Years on Death Row, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabama-death-row 
[https://perma.cc/TZL3-T448] (last visited July 8, 2018). 
 67. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 68. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1089. 
 69. Id. 
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IV.   Presuming Prejudice 
Once a reviewing court deems defense counsel constitutionally 
deficient for failing to subject incriminating forensic science 
evidence to meaningful adversarial testing,70 prejudice should be 
presumed and a new trial ordered. Forensic evidence has become an 
indispensable field for criminal defense practitioners to tackle. 
“Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available 
defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of 
expert evidence, whether [at] pretrial, at trial, or both.”71 This is 
especially so in the most serious of criminal cases—homicides, sex 
offenses, armed felonies—that carry the harshest of punishments—
life in prison, life without parole, or even death. In such cases, 
“defense lawyers must be aware that prosecutors may put fairly 
unreliable forensic evidence on the stand, and at trial courts have 
traditionally permitted even invalid or overstated forensics.”72 
Unreliable forensic science evidence has been uniquely successful at 
convicting the innocent.73 Where the requisite adversarial testing of 
such evidence is absent, confidence in the outcome is undermined.74 
Consider the case mentioned at the outset.75 The Frye motion 
having been perfunctorily denied, the inculpatory results of the FST 
program will soon be admitted at trial. Counsel then faces a variety 
of choices, the following of which are neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive: concede the reliability of the results and argue 
that the presence of DNA is not incriminating (because of innocent 
presence or secondary transfer, for instance); present evidence and 
argue that the admissibility ruling notwithstanding, the underlying 
validity of the software is not sufficiently established to be trusted; or 
argue that the results are just wrong, because in this instance the 
software or the analyst simply made a mistake. Defense counsel 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1984). 
 71. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011). 
 72. Garrett, supra note 57, at 1168. 
 73. See Misapplication of Forensic Science, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 75. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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might pursue these theories via cross-examination, the presentation 
of a defense expert, or both. 
Where counsel does none of that before the jury, or does so little as 
to render deficient assistance, how can a court possibly be situated to 
reliably determine that an effective attorney would not have achieved 
a different outcome?76 Undertaking this inquiry requires answering a 
host of questions reviewing courts are ill-suited to address. In the 
case involving FST, for example, how would the jury have responded 
to an attack on the foundational validity of the software?77 Or, an 
attack on the validity as applied?78 What if the defense attorney had 
exposed the prosecution as having fallen into the trap of the 
“Prosecutor’s Fallacy,”79 or explained the “Swamping Effect”?80 
Under these circumstances, a reviewing court cannot reliably or 
realistically opine on what an adequate adversarial attack on the 
forensic evidence “might disclose as to the facts.”81 
Maybe the attorney attempted some cross-examination; does that 
make the reviewing court’s job easier? Some scientists think not. “If 
cross-examination is to be the only way to discover misleading or 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Regardless of the extent to which evidence is presented in post-trial proceedings in an attempt to 
create a record demonstrating prejudice, the courts, to determine prejudice, must still engage in 
guesswork built upon speculation. Pre-trial and mid-trial rulings determine the admissibility of evidence, 
which affects which witnesses are or are not called, which affects the arguments that are made, all of 
which bear upon the ultimate outcome, with counsel refining and reconsidering strategy all along. 
Moreover, there are valuable reasons to engage in a deficiency analysis when reviewing all forensic 
science IAC cases, as discussed in section III, supra. 
 77. “Foundational validity” is the “scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of 
evidence being based on ‘reliable principles and methods.’” PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 43. 
 78. “Validity as applied” is the “scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of an expert 
having ‘reliably applied the principles and methods.’” PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 43. 
 79. See generally William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical 
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 167, 171–72 (1987). The “Prosecutor’s Fallacy” occurs when a prosecuting attorney, in 
the presentation of evidence or argument, “transposes the conditional” and argues that the probability 
that a given DNA profile came from someone other than the defendant is equivalent to the likelihood 
ratio produced by the DNA analysis. PETER GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 18 (2014). 
 80. The “Swamping Effect” occurs when the fact-finder disproportionately discounts exculpatory 
non-scientific evidence due to a very high—sometimes into the billions or more—likelihood ratio 
connecting DNA (or other scientific) evidence to the defendant. Gill, supra note 79, at 105. 
 81. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932). 
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inadequate testimony by forensic scientists, then too much is being 
expected from it.”82 
Another commentator rejects, almost out of hand, the 
argument that “the searing test of a rigorous cross-
examination” is a sufficient safeguard in this context. He 
writes: “All that one can say to such an argument is that the 
lawyers who make it should know better, and, if they do 
know better, as they must if they are experienced trial 
lawyers, they should have more conscience than to 
perpetuate such a myth.”83 
Some judges agree as well.84 “[E]xperience has shown that, at least 
in criminal trials, the suggestion that the ‘adversarial system’ 
represents an adequate means of demonstrating the unreliability of 
forensic evidence is mostly fanciful.”85 As Judge Gertner, a former 
trial-level federal judge who presided over trials that included expert 
testimony, observed, “The best cross-examiner, with the best skills in 
the usual driving-under-the-influence case, may not be up to par 
when complex forensic evidence is involved.”86 
If even an experienced defense attorney’s cross-examination may 
not be sufficient to effectively demonstrate the invalidity of proffered 
forensic evidence, reliance on the role of cross-examination to ferret 
out unreliable science—particularly ineffective cross-examination 
and what a reviewing judge speculates a more effective cross may or 
may not have accomplished—is misplaced. Faced with this reality, 
courts are not equipped to make reliable prejudice determinations 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Paul C. Giannelli, Defense Experts and the Myth of Cross-Examination, 30 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 
(2016) (quoting Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the 
Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989)). 
 83. Paul C. Giannelli & Sarah Antonucci, Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 
CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 4 (2012) (quoting Barton Ingraham, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on 
the Role of the Criminologist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WITNESS 178, 183 (Patrick R. Anderson & 
L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987)). 
 84. Edwards & Mnookin, supra note 5. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Gertner, supra note 39, at 793. 
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when reviewing claims that a defense attorney was deficient in 
combating incriminating forensic science evidence. Prejudice review 
simply becomes a matter of “garbage in, garbage out.” That is, 
untested, unreliable forensic evidence comes in at trial; the reviewing 
court justifies the conviction because the defendant has not satisfied 
the stringent Strickland prejudice standard; and that same untested 
unreliable forensic evidence remains in place to sustain the 
conviction. 
The concern, made clear by wrongful convictions caused by faulty 
forensics, is that some doubt about the integrity of the forensic 
evidence or the reliability of the incriminating science typically is not 
sufficient for courts to find prejudice in the IAC context.87 Reviewing 
courts conclude either that: (1) the non-scientific evidence proves the 
defendant is guilty (resulting in no IAC prejudice) or (2) the science 
proves the defendant is innocent (resulting in an exoneration). 
Anything short of (2) is enough, under Strickland, to justify 
sustaining the conviction. But those two polar opposites should not 
comprise the breadth of review that criminal convictions receive 
when based on forensic science evidence, particularly where the 
defense challenge to such evidence has been deemed deficient.88 
Rather, applying the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and 
standard of proof at play in criminal prosecutions, the defense may 
rightfully prevail in a criminal case by raising doubts about whether 
the forensic science evidence is foundationally valid, was validly 
applied, or should otherwise be trusted. Without accounting for the 
unique role that forensic science evidence plays in the criminal legal 
system—its power to convict unjustly, its ability to exonerate rightly, 
and the foreignness of its underlying scientific principles (or lack 
thereof) to the non-scientist judicial officers presiding—the prejudice 
inquiry in the forensic evidence context does not do its job. As a 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1175. 
 88. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free.”). 
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result, courts should presume prejudice where defense counsel is 
deficient in meaningfully confronting incriminating forensic science. 
CONCLUSION 
“The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the 
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be 
done.”89 “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too 
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice 
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”90 
Calling on non-scientist judges to try to make reliable hypothetical 
prejudice calculations about the impact of forensic science is a fool’s 
errand. Such inquiry should be abandoned in the context of IAC 
claims for failure to adequately test incriminating forensic science 
evidence. 
There need be no fear that the floodgates will open to presuming 
prejudice in the context of other IAC claims. Forensic science 
evidence is unique for at least three reasons. First, it simultaneously 
has been the cause of wrongful convictions and exonerations of the 
innocent for almost three decades.91 Thus, forensic evidence merits 
heightened scrutiny when it contributes to a criminal conviction. 
Second, judges are not scientists; they should not be relied upon to 
make reliable judgments about the impact a sophisticated scientific 
method may or may not have had on the outcome of a trial. Third, as 
the NAS Report and President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology Report make clear, forensic disciplines long deemed 
valid have been and continue to be exposed as fraught with error. 
Forensic science evidence plays a vital role within the criminal 
legal system, a system that is staffed predominantly by people who 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 
(1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). 
 91. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/8APD-
RBXB] (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). At least 353 people have been exonerated in the United States 
thanks to DNA evidence. Id. 
21
Loudon-Brown: Garbage In, Garbage Out: Revising Strickland As Applied To Forens
Published by Reading Room, 2018
914 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
are not scientists. To ensure the Sixth Amendment guarantee to 
effective assistance of counsel is satisfied in all cases, courts should 
require that defense attorneys effectively subject incriminating 
forensic science evidence to the “crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing.”92 If an attorney is deficient in that regard, prejudice should 
be presumed. Short of that the Sixth Amendment is violated, and the 
integrity of a criminal conviction remains in doubt. 
                                                                                                                 
 92. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
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